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Abstract
Many phenomena in the natural world are complex, so scientists study them through 
simplified and idealised models. Philosophers of science have sought to explain how 
these models relate to the world. On most accounts, models do not represent the 
world directly, but through target systems. However, our knowledge of target sys-
tems is incomplete. First, what is the process by which target systems come about? 
Second, what types of entity are they? I argue that the basic conception of target sys-
tems, on which other conceptions depend, is as parts of the world. I outline the pro-
cess of target system specification and show that it is a crucial step in modelling. I 
also develop an account of target system evaluation, based on aptness. Paying close 
attention to target system specification and evaluation can help scientists minimise 
the frequency and extent of mistakes, when they are using models to investigate phe-
nomena in complex real-world systems.
Keywords Target system · Model-world relations · Relevance · Omission · Ecology
Introduction
The marmots of Vancouver Island (Marmota vancouverensis) are classified as criti-
cally endangered. It was estimated that their population dropped 80–90% since the 
1980s and reached a low of 70 individuals in 1998 (Brashares et  al. 2010). Yet 
the cause of this rapid decline was a mystery. The marmots were not hunted, their 
sources of food were unaltered, there were no new predators or competitors and 
the small disturbances to their habitat (small-scale logging) seemed to have a posi-
tive effect on the population, as the absence of thick tree roots in clearings made 
the building of burrows much easier. Nonetheless, the marmot population began to 
decline in the 1980s and kept on declining, despite some of the early conservation 
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efforts (such as the expansion of Strathcona Provincial Park in 1995). Something 
had to be done quickly to preserve the species from extinction.
As is often the case when dealing with highly complex systems, the scientists who 
took on the problem of the Vancouver Island Marmots (VIM) adopted a modelling 
approach. They used a simple and highly idealised model: logistic growth. This model 
measures how the growth rate of a population is limited by the density of the popula-
tion itself, that is it describes how populations grow when they have limited environ-
mental resources and are not subject to other limiting factors such as competition with 
other species, predation, migration etc. But how did the scientists decide which model 
to use? What was the connection between the model and the actual marmots?
There is substantial literature that addressing how idealised models can provide 
information about real world phenomena. On many of these accounts, models do not 
represent the world directly, but target some aspects of the world and represent those 
(Knuuttila 2005; Matthewson and Weisberg 2009; Suárez 2010; Peschard 2010). 
These target systems can be many types of things, such as other models, hypothetical 
systems, images, equations (see for example Suarez 2003; Weisberg 2013), though 
the consensus seems to be that in the simplest cases of model-world relations, target 
systems are parts of the world (Frigg 2009; Giere 2004; Peschard 2010). Thus, the 
short answer to the above question is that if models represent target systems and tar-
get systems are parts of the world, then models provide information about the world.
Even though this picture is largely correct, there are many interesting questions 
lurking beneath the surface. The most important of these are: ‘which parts of the 
world?’ and ‘how are they determined?’ So far, the most coherent answers to these 
questions have been given by the somewhat complementary accounts of Peschard 
(2010) and Weisberg (2013). According to Peschard, modellers target the relevant 
parts of the world for the phenomenon they are studying. According to Weisberg, 
target systems are determined through a process of abstraction. In other words, 
modellers determine a target system by deciding which aspects of the phenomenon 
of interest is relevant for their model. I agree with Weisberg and Peshcard that this is 
part of determining a target system, but it is not the full story. In what follows, I will 
argue that it is only one of four steps in target system specification.
Moreover, though these accounts of model-world relations do more than previous 
ones to highlight the existence of target systems, they still do not fully appreciate the 
importance and role of target systems in scientific practice. For example, Weisberg 
presents the determination of target systems as a simple and straightforward mat-
ter, or at least as a scientific matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis, not 
of philosophical interest (p. 92). He dismisses any difficulties in determining target 
systems as the hallmark of young disciplines. As the disciplines mature, the target 
systems solidify and if disagreement continues, this “may ultimately split a research 
community into subfields which cannot see eye to eye” (p. 92).
Weisberg is right to claim that disagreement regarding target systems can 
lead to splitting a research community. A discipline that fits this picture is Ecol-
ogy. Traditionally, Ecology was seen to have progressed from a merely obser-
vational to a truly scientific field with the introduction of mathematical models 
in the late nineteenth Century (Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993). These were 
population-level models with few parameters, that were meant to apply widely 
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to populations across different taxa (Kingsland 1995). Yet these simple models 
did not have sufficiently high predictive success, so ecologists began searching 
for alternative ways to approach problems. The main differences in these alterna-
tive approaches were their different conceptions of ecological systems, such as 
in terms of entire communities or ecosystems, rather than individual populations 
(Odenbaugh 2007). Nowadays, the different subfields within ecology do not, as 
Weisberg states, see ‘eye to eye’ regarding the appropriate level of grain at which 
ecological systems should be studied, and consequently regarding the appropriate 
type of model that should be used to investigate various ecological phenomena.
However, this should be very interesting to philosophers. Why think, for 
instance, that ecosystem-sized target is better for understanding ecological phe-
nomena than a target system comprised of populations? Moreover, are target sys-
tems truly determined within each subfield? For instance, community ecology is 
one of these recognised subfields, yet there are disagreements within the field 
between those who employ a holistic (following Clements) and those who adopt 
an individualistic (following Gleason) conception of a community (Odenbaugh 
2007). Finally, even if scientists have determined a particular approach within a 
subfield, is their target system fully determined? For example, the scientists stud-
ying the VIM were working within the discipline of population ecology. Can we 
infer from this what their target system was? I do not believe that we can. In what 
follows, I will argue that determining the appropriate target system for a particu-
lar scientific investigation is laborious, time-consuming and fraught with difficul-
ties even for scientists working within an established discipline or sub-discipline. 
In fact, Ecology is a particularly apt discipline to focus on for the explication of 
the use and role of target systems. This is because, on the one hand, some scien-
tists (such as Brashares et  al.) provide meticulous detail of their targets, but on 
the other hand, there are many examples within the discipline, where failure to 
correctly specify targets resulted in inaccurate model predictions. Thus, under-
standing the use and role of target systems in Ecology is a very good place to 
begin a philosophical investigation of target systems in science.
The paper is structured in the following way. In section  “Specifying a target 
system”, I lay out the basics of my view on target systems. I start by examin-
ing the VIM case in detail, highlighting four processes that were necessary for 
preparing the ‘world’ so that the model could be applied to it (2.1). I then pro-
vide a more general account of target system specification (2.2), followed by the 
explication of the ontological status of target systems (2.3), and an examination 
of when a full-blown investigation of target systems is likely to be fruitful (2.4). I 
then turn to how target systems can be evaluated, with the notion of aptness, and 
examine two different types of mistakes that can be made in the course of target 
system specification, which can have far-reaching consequences for actual scien-
tific practice (“Evaluating target systems”). In section “Loose ends: general and 
hypothetical targets”, I examine more complex cases, where the targets of mod-
els are not straightforward parts of the world but generalised or hypothetical sys-
tems. I argue that genuine cases of general and hypothetical targets are actually 
infrequent in science, but that we should still adopt an overall pluralistic attitude 
towards the nature of target systems.
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Specifying a target system
The VIM target system
Let us start by examining the case of the VIM in more detail. How did the scientists 
go about investigating VIM growth? They realised that the VIM population was not 
described by the standard logistic growth equation (whose differential form can be 
seen in Eq. 1, see also Fig. 1a dotted line). Normally, as an environment becomes 
more densely populated, the growth rate of the population drops, as there are not 
enough resources to sustain an exponentially growing population.
Here, (r) is the intrinsic growth rate, the maximum possible growth rate of 
the population. The second important component of the model is (K), the carry-
ing capacity of the environment. (K) imposes the upper limit on population growth 
because it is the maximum number of individual organisms that a particular envi-
ronment can support. (K) is determined by the availability of resources in the envi-
ronment and varies across environments and species. Populations displaying logistic 
growth have an initial phase of rapid growth, where the growth rate itself increases 
exponentially. As resources are used up, the growth rate slows, until the carrying 
capacity is reached, whereupon the growth rate stabilises.
The problem was that the VIM’s population was dropping even though there 
seemed to be abundant resources. The scientists hypothesized that the cause of the 
VIM population decline was due to an ‘Allee effect’, which occurs when there is 
a positive correlation between the density of a population and its growth rate at 
low population densities (Fig.  1a, red and black curves). This means that when a 
(1)dN
dt
= rN
(
1 −
N
K
)
a Per capita Logistic Growth Curve and Allee efects Allee efect in the VIMb
The relationships between the per capita population growth rate and either population
size or dens ity for negative density dependenc e (dotted curve), and weak (dashed 
curve) and strong (s olid curve) Allee ef fects. In weak or strong Allee ef fects, the
relationship is positive at l ow population sizes or dens ities, where positive density-
dependent (Allee effect ) mechanisms overpowe r negative density-dependent 
(intraspecific competition) ones. It is negative at high population sizes or dens ities,
where the converse is true. Reprinted from (Berec et al. 2007)
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Fig. 1  Logistic growth and the Allee effect
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population size drops to a sufficiently low density, it will not recover despite an 
abundance of resources (Courchamp et al. 1999).
Figure 1b shows that the VIM were in fact exhibiting an Allee effect. The scien-
tific investigation revealed that this was caused by a peculiarity of the VIM, namely 
that they are highly social. When the population falls below a certain density, the 
VIM find it hard to locate potential mates, especially because the smaller popula-
tions mean that there is less division of labour (caring for young, guarding against 
predators) so each marmot spends more time and effort foraging and looking for 
mates. All this results in lower instances of mating, hence the drop in population 
despite the abundance of resources.
Yet even if scientists have a hypothesis about what model to use for a particular 
investigation, how do they apply the model to the world? More specifically, what 
exactly do they apply the model to? In other words, what needs to happen so that we 
get from Fig. 1a, b? Merely stating that they applied the model to the VIM, does not 
do justice to the time and effort spent ‘preparing’ the ‘world’ so that the model could 
be applied to it. As it happens, Brashares and colleagues documented this process in 
some detail. In fact, these scientists are part of a small but steadily growing group 
of researchers who are beginning to acknowledge the importance of this preliminary 
work and publish it, albeit in the paper’s supplementary materials (reprinted here in 
Box 1). It is this preliminary work that corresponds to the process of target system 
specification.
Specifying a target system is a four-part process. The first step was to determine 
exactly where the study would take place, i.e. the spatio-temporal location where the 
phenomenon manifests. I call this the domain of study. Here, the domain of study 
encompasses the two areas in Vancouver Island with VIM populations (Fig. 2).
I should note that identifying the domain of study is sometimes rather obvi-
ous, and can be inferred from the context of the paper, so it is not always explicitly 
stated. However, in some cases, such as this one, the extent of the domain is sim-
ply not obvious at first glance, so it is useful to delineate the exact domain of the 
Fig. 2  The domain of study—
geographical location of VIM 
populations
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phenomenon under investigation. In order to do this, the scientists had to estimate 
the territories of the marmot populations and make sure that the two populations did 
not overlap. This is conceptually straightforward but quite laborious, as it is based 
on actual long-term observations of a subset of marmots (see Box 1A for a graphical 
representation of the territory estimate). This information was also useful because it 
demonstrated that the populations had not been displaced in the last 75 years. This, 
in turn, showed that the spatial variables of the VIM remained unchanged, so the 
scientists could legitimately avail themselves of pre-existing data on the VIM popu-
lations, dating back to 1973.
The second step was to partition the domain. Put simply, partitioning is the divi-
sion of the domain of study into parts.1 In other words, when partitioning, a scien-
tist decides how to carve up the domain of study. This often amounts to deciding 
the level of grain at which the domain will be partitioned. For example, the VIM 
domain was partitioned at the level of organisms (e.g. individual marmots, plants, 
insects etc.). An alternative partition of the same domain could be at the level of 
meta-populations or whole ecosystems, if, for instance, the scientists approached 
the phenomenon from an ecosystem ecology perspective.2 Partitioning also involves 
identifying properties that correspond to each part. Each part, e.g. an individual 
marmot, will have a long list of properties that pertain to it; it will have a certain 
weight and height, a certain age, it will be male or female, its fur will be a certain 
shade of brown, its eyes will be a certain colour and so on.
The third step is to determine which parts and properties are relevant for the 
investigation. Here, the marmots themselves and at least some of their demographic 
properties (e.g. being male or female, being a certain age, having a particular gesta-
tion period) are obviously relevant, because they are necessary for investigating the 
growth of a population (whichever growth model is used). For example, the proce-
dure for determining r (the intrinsic growth rate for the logistic growth model) is as 
follows: first, the scientists collect data on birth and death events and on the age, sex 
and gestation period of the population. These are used to construct an age-structured 
‘life table’, a tabular summary of the birth rates, death rates and fecundity of the 
population (age, sex and gestation period are used to calculate fecundity). The val-
ues in the table are then used to calculate r (Ricklefs and Miller 2000) (See Box 1B 
for a visual representation of a part of this process).
Still, knowing that a property is relevant does not mean that it can be used. 
Sometimes, the data is simply not available, or not of sufficiently high quality. 
Even something as conceptually straightforward as determining the age structure 
1 I will be using the terms ‘parts’ and ‘properties’ throughout this paper. By parts, I mean parts of the 
world. I use this term because I want to emphasize that these units have the same ontological status as 
the larger system which they find themselves in. The natural system is the whole, and the units are some 
parts of it. The parts have not been altered or changed in any way. I use the term ‘properties’ simply to 
refer to characteristics or features of these units. A detailed account of the nature of properties is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Moreover, the nature of this analysis is such that it can remain silent on the fun-
damental nature of properties. All that is needed is a way to refer to features that are predicated or instan-
tiated, universally or not, by the units of the analysis.
2 I will return to the topic of alternative partitions in sections “The ontological status of target systems” 
and “Loose ends: general and hypothetical targets”.
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and sex ratio of a population is difficult, as it is based on observations of a sample 
of the population. Furthermore, even with the best technology (i.e. tags), the data 
can be very patchy. In this case, the scientists had to spend three years observ-
ing the marmots and documenting all the properties they deemed relevant. Then, 
they had to compare their observational data with the existing observational data 
(from the 70s), in order to be sure that data from both periods could be used (see 
Box 1B).
Some aspects of the system are obviously irrelevant, such as marmot eye col-
our or the gravitational force of the moon. Other factors are not obviously irrel-
evant, but can ‘safely ignored’. In some cases, the scientists might not know that a 
factor is irrelevant, but can make an educated guess, based on existing ecological 
knowledge. For example, factors such as temperature, might have an effect on 
marmot growth, but if the temperature in the last five years falls within the appro-
priate range, then the scientists can assume that has not been the cause of the 
decline.
Other aspects might require closer scrutiny. For example, an increase in the num-
ber of predators could be the cause of the decline. Scientists know that the VIM are 
preyed on by wolves, eagles and cougars. They also knew that there had been a very 
small increase in the predation rate in the mid-1990s. However, this increase was too 
small to account for the magnitude of the drop in the marmot population. Second, 
such an increase in predation rate is usually accompanied by a corresponding rise 
in reproductive rate of the prey population. In this case, however, the marmot repro-
duction was falling and at an increasing rate! Thus, the scientists decided to omit 
predation from their investigation and focus instead on the factors that affected the 
reproductive rate of the VIM.
At this point, the scientists have specified a target system. They have decided the 
grain at which the domain will be partitioned (i.e. individual marmots rather than 
meta-populations or marmot alleles), they have decided which properties of the 
marmots are relevant (demographic properties) and they have also decided that no 
other organisms are relevant for the investigation (e.g. particular prey, predators or 
competitors). As it turns out, this was also a successful case of target system speci-
fication. The scientists chose an apt target system that allowed them to determine 
that the standard logistic growth model did apply sufficiently well to the population, 
and were then able to determine that there was something missing from their target 
system. Moreover, what was missing was not one of the most common factors, such 
as competition or predation, but a factor entirely specific to the VIM, whose impor-
tance was hitherto unknown (sociality). Still, because the scientists had conducted 
the preliminary work, they were able to recognise that there were differences in the 
time allocated to foraging versus socialising between the 1970s and 2000s popu-
lations (see Box  1 D). This information was incorporated into the growth model 
(with the Allee effect), which then described the population’s growth much more 
accurately. I should note that the sociality-induced Allee effect from this study has 
since been incorporated into the highly successful VIM recovery programme, which 
focuses predominantly on increasing the VIM population through captive breeding 
(as opposed to the most common alternative strategy: culling of predators) (Vancou-
ver Island Marmot Recovery Team 2008).
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Specifying a target system: a more general account
The VIM case was relatively simple and straightforward. The scientists were inves-
tigating a well-known phenomenon in a clearly defined domain. Moreover, though 
their choice of partition and omissions were time-consuming and laborious, it was 
conceptually straightforward: their partition was typical for population ecology, 
there were few factors whose relevance needed to be checked, and most importantly, 
there were no factors that were mistakenly omitted as irrelevant. However, specify-
ing a target system is often much more difficult. In this section, I will give a more 
general account of target system specification indicating where, how and why dif-
ficulties are likely to manifest.
The motivation for specifying a target system is that a model cannot be applied to 
a system without some preparation. Scientists must pick out the parts and properties 
of a real-world system that they wish to study, given the context of a particular phe-
nomenon. The first point to note is that on my view, there is a distinction between a 
target system and a phenomenon. This is important because sometimes philosophers 
use the two terms interchangeably (see for example Matthewson and Weisberg 2009, 
p. 180). Here, phenomena are states or behaviours of a real-world system or group 
of systems, studied by a particular discipline, such as population growth, competi-
tion or predation. A target system is those aspects of the real-world system that are 
studied in order to gain knowledge about the phenomenon.
Moving on to the process itself, the domain of study is where the phenomenon takes 
place. In simple cases, this amounts to a spatio-temporal region such as an ecosystem, 
the Pacific Ocean, a cylinder containing gas, or in the social sciences, a setting which 
counts as the environment for a group of people, such as a neighbourhood, a church or 
a laboratory. There are more complex cases where the system being studied does not 
exist in the world. These will be discussed in section “Targets of hypothetical models”.
Partitioning is where things start to get really interesting. In some cases, parti-
tions are standardised within disciplines. As we saw, in population ecology the 
standard partitions are individual organisms. Other disciplines have different stand-
ardised partitions: in population genetics, domains are partitioned at the level of 
alleles, in organic chemistry partitions are at the grain of organic molecules, in phys-
ics they may be particles, in psychology they are individuals, in anthropology they 
are groups of individuals and so on.
So far, I have described simple cases where the scientist partitions the domain 
into roughly equally sized parts. However, it is also possible for partitions to cut 
across levels of specificity. For example, a plant ecologist studying competition, 
might group an individual plant and the mycorrhizal fungi in its roots as one part, 
and the nitrogen which the fungi help the plant to absorb as another part. Alterna-
tively, she might partition the plants into individual parts and group together the 
entire population of fungi with the nitrogen molecules as ‘below-ground factors’.3
Once the partition is set, scientists decide which parts and properties defined by 
the partition are relevant and which are not. Those that are not considered relevant 
3 For examples of such a partitions, see (Phillips et al. 2016; Sackett et al. 2010).
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are omitted. Omission is best understood as ignoring certain aspects of a system. It 
works in the same way as putting a coloured plastic film over a picture; the objects 
that are the same colour as the film disappear. For example, if we put a green film 
over a picture of vase of red roses on a blue background, then the leaves and stems 
of the roses will disappear. If we put a red film over the picture, then the rosebuds 
will disappear. The ability to choose between different film colours is analogous to 
the scientists’ ability to choose between different methods or models to study a par-
ticular phenomenon. The parts and properties that do not show up through a par-
ticular filter are analogous to the omitted factors, while the remaining parts of the 
picture that are still visible are the analogues of the parts and properties that make 
up the target system.
Two clarifications. First, are partitioning and omission truly distinct? Doesn’t parti-
tioning (especially in the case of cross-cutting partitions) implicitly include omission? 
Conversely, doesn’t a particular omission imply a particular partition? I agree that it 
may seem that the distinction is superfluous, especially since scientists do not actually 
distinguish between how they partition a domain and how they choose what to omit. 
Nonetheless, I believe that there is a conceptual distinction between the two processes, 
even if they are not always distinguishable in practice. Partitioning is carving the domain 
into parts. The same domain can be partitioned in many different ways, but all those 
partitions will contain the same amount of ‘stuff’. The difference between partitions is 
that this ‘stuff’ is organised differently. Omission, on the other hand, is the assertion that 
some of this stuff is not relevant for the purposes at hand. Different parts and properties 
can be omitted from partitioned domain, depending on the purpose at hand.
Second, my notion of omission seems very similar to what others have termed 
‘abstraction’. For example, Weisberg defines target systems as abstractions over real 
phenomena, generated through a process of abstracting (2013 p. 116). I prefer the 
term ‘omission’, because ‘abstraction’ is quite ambiguous in philosophy, as it can 
refer to non-concrete concepts or ideas (Cartwright 1989), generalizations (Levy 
2018), isolations (Mäki 2009) or parts of a larger system (Jones 2005), and whether 
or not all these terms are coextensive is a matter of debate (Godfrey-Smith 2009; 
Humphreys 1995; Levy 2018). Moreover, on some of these accounts, it is possible 
for an abstract product to come about through different processes (Levy 2018). In 
the case of target system specification, the process matters. Target systems are not 
specified by other ‘abstracting’ processes such as de-concretizing or generalizing—
they are specified through partitioning and omission. Finally, my choice of terminol-
ogy avoids some of the problems faced by Weisberg, when distinguishing between 
merely abstract and generalized target systems (see section “Loose ends: general and 
hypothetical targets”).
The ontological status of target systems
I have outlined the process of target system specification, but what of the products 
yielded by this process? That is, what sorts of things are target systems? As stated in 
the introduction, they are usually thought of as parts of the world. But what exactly 
does this mean? What is the ontological status of a part of the world? The short 
 A. Elliott-Graves 
1 3
28 Page 10 of 22
answer is that it is concrete and therefore real. Yet a possibly worry is that the pro-
cess of specifying a target system, which includes partitioning and omission, yields 
entities that are mere representations, rather than concrete and real parts of the 
world. The response is that there is a difference between referring to target systems 
and target systems themselves. When we talk or write about a target system, we are 
referring to it or representing it in a way similar to the way a model represents it. 
This representation can be simplified or distorted, yet the neither the existence of the 
representation nor the process of representing alters the system itself. The processes 
of partitioning and omission are equally non-intrusive with respect to the ontologi-
cal status of the parts of the target system. All we do when we partition and identify 
relevant parts and properties, is group a part of the world in a particular way. But 
this does not change the parts themselves. The point is that the target system has the 
same ontological status as the domain. If we think that my laptop is concrete and 
real, then the ‘R’ key on the keyboard also concrete and real.4
When are target systems important?
Now that the basics of target system specification are in place, we can think about 
their value. Do all scientists always specify targets? Should they? Are there some 
disciplines and/or types of investigation where targets are more valuable? The short 
answer is that many scientists do not need to spend time and effort specifying target 
systems. This is because there are some disciplines/sub-disciplines/types of scien-
tific investigation where the target systems are too obvious to need particular atten-
tion. For example, if a scientist is interested in determining whether a particular 
substance will kill a bacterium, their target system is clear and straightforward. The 
experimental setup will exclude/control all other factors and the scientist will then 
determine the effect of the substance on the bacterium in this precise context. Of 
course, this does not mean that the scientific investigation does not have a target sys-
tem, merely that it is not necessary to spend any time specifying it in detail.
In fact, the value of specifying target systems often becomes apparent only when 
scientists run into difficulties. This is quite common in investigations of complex 
systems, where scientists have yet to determine which parts of a network of inter-
connected causes are actually responsible for particular phenomena. This is why tar-
get systems are especially important in disciplines such as Ecology. In addition to 
the underlying complexity of ecological systems, there are deep disagreements in 
the field about the best concepts and methods that should be used to conduct eco-
logical investigations.
A sceptical reader may point out that this is whole point of the investigating the 
phenomena in the first place. That is, isn’t it enough to see whether a particular 
model correctly predicts the behaviour of the system? Specifying a target system 
in detail can help to avoid model failure or to deal with an inaccurate prediction. 
4 Of course, it is possible to insist that any partition is a mere convention. Yet if this is the case then the 
whole domain must also be a convention, because the domain is itself partitioned from the rest of the 
world. The point is that the ontological status of the target system is the same as that of the domain.
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For example, applying the basic logistic growth model to the VIM target system 
revealed that something was amiss, as the model did not accurately describe the 
population. Target system specification showed that an additional factor was relevant 
in this case, namely the VIM sociality. In this case, there was no need to change the 
model being used, as the same model could easily be modified to describe a popula-
tion with an Allee effect, i.e. a population that is affected by density, but only above 
a certain threshold. However, in other cases, model failure or inaccurate predictions 
might not be easy to remedy. Sometimes the use of a particular type of model per-
sists because scientists have not realised that the cause of predictive failure is the 
absence of a relevant factor from the model. An example of this comes from plant 
ecology, where for many years, scientists failed to solve the problem of erratic pre-
dictions in models of drought sensitivity, because of a persistence of ‘surface bias’ 
(Phillips et al. 2016). Even though scientists knew that below-ground factors affected 
plant growth, they mistakenly believed them to be irrelevant for their models. Only 
after re-examination of their targets did they realise the importance of these factors.5
Finally, target system specification can aid in model choice. Specifying the target 
system, or even comparing two or more target systems from a domain is an impor-
tant part of the preliminary work for determining which model to use for a particu-
lar purpose. Again, this is not always straightforward. For example, there is a long-
standing debate, in ecology, concerning the optimal level of model complexity. On 
the one hand, reducing complexity allows scientists to distinguish between the core 
causal factors that give rise to classes of phenomena and mere details that are idi-
osyncratic to particular systems (May 2001; Perretti and Munch 2013). On the other 
hand, mirroring the complexity of real-world systems increases the likelihood that 
models capture all the relevant causal factors and dynamics giving rise to complex 
phenomena (Evans et al. 2013; Travis et al. 2014). A close look at target systems can 
show when scientists should opt for more or less complexity in their models.
Evaluating target systems
It may seem rather odd to think that we can evaluate target systems, if they are just 
real parts of the world. It does not really make sense to think of a part of the world, 
such as a field or a flower or a desk as good or bad per se. Nonetheless, it does make 
sense to compare parts of the world, for a particular purpose and within a particular 
context. For example, one field may be better than another field for growing a par-
ticular crop, or better than a cliff for the purposes of playing volleyball. It can be 
worse than another field for the establishment of a biological pest and worse than 
a river for farming trout. Similarly, in the case of target systems, when we evaluate 
them, we are not trying to determine whether they are good or bad in themselves, 
but whether they are apt for a particular purpose. A full-blown account of target sys-
tem aptness is beyond the scope of this paper, but for the remainder of this section I 
5 For more details on this example, see section “Evaluating target systems”.
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will provide a general outline of the account, illustrated by some examples of inapt 
targets.
Recall that target system specification is comprised of two main elements, parti-
tioning the domain into parts and properties and determining which of those parts 
and properties are relevant for the purposes of the scientific investigation. A prelimi-
nary definition of aptness is the following:
A target system T is apt for a scientific purpose S just in case:
 (i) Its partition P is useful for S and
 (ii) P* (the partition after omission) contains all and only the relevant causal fac-
tors for S.
In order to make sense of this definition, we need to determine what is meant by 
useful and relevant. I will use aspects of the kairetic account of causal explanation, 
which provides a way of identifying the actual causes of an event from a wider web 
of potential factors (Strevens 2004, 2008). A few notes on this choice. There are 
many areas in philosophy where usefulness and relevance are examined, especially 
in philosophy of language.6 However, I have chosen the approach taken in by the 
literature on scientific explanation, specifically Strevens’s account, for the following 
reasons. First, the type of ‘context’ investigated in scientific explanation is the same 
as in the case of target systems, and it is affected by scientific disciplines, norms and 
practices. While these may have analogues in communication and cognition, it is 
simpler to use the theory where context is restricted to scientific practice. Second, 
Strevens distinguishes between three types of causal factors: those that true differ-
ence makers, those that could have causal influence on an event but did not and 
those that are merely tangential. One of the important difficulties faced by scientists 
applying models to real world systems is to determine which out of a network of 
possible causes are true difference-makers. Thus, an account that makes this exact 
distinction ought to be helpful in an account of target system evaluation. Finally, 
Strevens proposes a test to determine which factors count as difference makers, 
called the eliminative procedure. This test can easily be adapted to the purposes of 
target system evaluation. More specifically, as I will show in this section, the two 
steps of the test correspond to and preserve the important aspects of partitioning and 
omission respectively.
However, I stress that Strevens’s account is an analogue for target system evalu-
ation. That is, we can apply Strevens’s framework for determining what is relevant 
for a scientific explanation to determining what parts of the world are relevant for a 
particular scientific purpose. The fact that his account focuses on explanation rather 
than other purposes of modelling (such as prediction or confirmation) does not mean 
that target systems can only be evaluated in terms of the context of explanation. The 
6 In philosophy of language, relevance constitutes an important aspect of the pragmatics of communi-
cation. For example, Grice argued that conversations should be understood as cooperative enterprises. 
Bringing relevant information to the conversation is a maxim that speakers ought to follow in order for a 
conversation to take place (Davis 2014).
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account works as an analogue because explanations, like target systems, can only be 
evaluated given a particular context. In the case of target systems, the context does 
not have to be using a model for the purposes of explanation. The same method of 
evaluation can be used, even if the context is using a model for prediction, confirma-
tion etc. In fact, my account of aptness can show why a target system that is apt for 
the purpose of explanation is inapt for the purpose of prediction. For example, if 
scientists wished to predict the growth of the VIM with the introduction of a new 
predator, then the target system described here would be inapt, as it assumes that 
predation is irrelevant. While we know that predation from the existing predators is 
not relevant, a new predator might have an important effect on the VIM growth.
According to Strevens (2004, 2008) the key for explaining an event is to pick out, 
from the complex causal network, those factors which made a difference to whether 
or not the event in question occurred. He argues that a key issue for causal accounts 
of explanation is their (in)ability to determine which causal factors are actually rel-
evant for a particular explanation, and which have a negligible degree of influence 
(Strevens 2008). For example, an event such as the death of Rasputin, could have 
been caused by a number of factors (he was famously poisoned, shot (twice) and 
finally tied up and drowned). A good explanation of the event will allow us to iden-
tify drowning as the difference-maker, i.e. the factor that ultimately caused Raspu-
tin’s death.
More specifically, explaining an event E begins by examining the causal network 
in which E is embedded, and picking out a part of that web that was sufficient to 
cause E. By ‘part’ Strevens means a set of actual initial conditions, and laws that 
could, in itself cause E. Yet Strevens also points out that in order to determine this 
causal network, we must first determine exactly what counts as the event E. In other 
words, we need to decide how finely grained we want our event to be specified. For 
instance, the answer to the question ‘why did Rasputin die’ will elicit an explana-
tion with fewer causal details than the explanation elicited by the question ‘why did 
Rasputin die in exactly the way he did?’ (Strevens 2004, p. 159). The second step is 
to construct a representation of this set of actual causes, which is called the veridi-
cal causal model (p. 162). It is a veridical model, because the conditions are actual 
causal influences on the event. In the model, relations of causal production are rep-
resented through relations of logical entailment. In other words, Strevens uses the 
notion of logical entailment to represent a situation in the real world, where a set of 
initial conditions produce an event in virtue of laws (p. 163).
In the case of target systems, we need to determine the usefulness of a partition, 
so as to have the appropriate context with which to determine the relevance of the 
parts and properties that are in the target system. It is standard in scientific practice 
to have a set hypothesis, which is often phrased as a question. This question can be 
used to determine how we should partition the domain. For example, in the case 
of the VIM, the question was ‘why is the VIM population dropping, even though 
there are abundant resources?’. This question determines the context for relevance, 
for example that marmots, resources and marmot demographics should somehow 
feature in the target system. Other aspects of the domain are not so clearly useful. 
For example, do we actually need to distinguish between male and female marmots? 
At first glance, this may seem unnecessarily fine-grained. However, as we have seen, 
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birth rates are a necessary aspect of determining r for the logistic growth model, 
hence the partition should be this fine-grained. In contrast, there is no need for an 
even finer-grained partition, e.g. at the level of marmot alleles. While they are obvi-
ously there as parts of marmots, the partition does not need to identify them as sepa-
rate parts.
In the VIM case, the appropriate level of partition was quite obvious, however, 
there are other cases where this is not so. For example, there is a debate in inva-
sive species research about the appropriate way to partition domains. On one side 
are those who believe domains should be partitioned into individual organisms and 
their properties, as invasions occur because some traits give invaders a competitive 
advantage (Jarchow and Cook 2009; Richardson and Rejmánek 2004). On the other 
side, are those who believe that domains should be partitioned in terms of whole 
communities, because community-level traits are the difference-makers in terms of 
whether an invasion succeeds or not (Kennedy et al. 2002; Levine and D’Antonio 
1999). Both sides have used models to successfully explain and predict particular 
invasion events (see discussion in Blackburn et al. 2011; Hayes and Barry 2007).
Still, looking more closely at the target systems shows that the finer grained par-
tition is more likely to yield successful results. The reason is that the finer grained 
partition allows scientists to include a greater variety of causal factors in their target 
systems, while the coarser grained partitions are more limited. For example, with a 
finer grained partition, scientists can include traits that give invaders a competitive 
advantage and traits that place native organisms at a disadvantage. In contrast, the 
coarser-grained partition does not allow scientists to include the traits that confer the 
competitive advantage to the invaders. The point here is not that the coarser grained 
partitions are never successful, but that tend to be less useful for determining the 
outcome of an invasion.
Returning to Strevens’s account, the third step is to eliminate from the causal 
model any factors that are not necessary in the causal production of E, i.e. that do 
not entail E. What remains is the set of initial conditions and laws that made a differ-
ence to the occurrence of E—the explanatory kernel of E (2004, p. 163). The causal 
network includes the drowning, the shooting and the poisoning, but also a number 
of other factors which have some causal influence on E, such as “the length of Ras-
putin’s beard, the day’s pollen count, the gravitational influence of Mars” (p. 158).
It is easy to see why drowning counts as a difference maker. ‘Being thrown in the 
river’ is part of the causal network that entails E, therefore is part of the veridical 
model. Also contained is a law which states that ‘people thrown in the river under 
certain conditions die’, and the conditions for which the law holds. Therefore, we 
cannot remove the being thrown into the river without invalidating the entailment. 
This means that being thrown into the river is a difference maker of E. Contrast 
this with the explanation of Rasputin’s death by poisoning. To do so we would con-
struct a causal model which contained the proposition that Rasputin was poisoned, 
together with a law which stated that a person poisoned under a set of conditions, 
will die. The problem is that in Rasputin’s case, these conditions did not hold. We 
now have two options. Either we bite the bullet and state the conditions were pre-
sent or we eliminate the conditions from the model. However, if we choose the first 
option, we end up with a causal model which is not veridical, as it asserts something 
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which not the case. On the other hand, if we eliminate the conditions from the causal 
model, then we are left with a model which does not entail E. This is because, as 
Rasputin showed, simply being given a certain poison does always result in death. 
Thus, the poisoning cannot be considered a difference-maker for Rasputin’s death.
We can apply a similar analysis to test which causal factors should be part of the 
target system. The parts of the domain that give rise to phenomenon are the equiva-
lent of the veridical causal model. This includes the marmots and their properties, 
along with the resources of the environment and other causal factors, such as preda-
tors. The marmots and their demographic properties are clearly relevant, because if 
we omit them, then the Allee effect does not occur. The resources of the environ-
ment are also relevant, even though they are not the cause of this particular type of 
decline. This is because resources are important for many aspects of VIM life and 
removing them or changing them would change the growth rate of the VIM (prob-
ably by accelerating their decline). In order to have this growth rate, resources are 
necessary aspects of the target system.
The equivalent to the poison, in this case, are the predators. Here, the scientists 
knew that predators could cause the VIM population to drop, hence they considered 
them. However, they determined that changing the amount of predators (within a 
certain range) would not have changed the behaviour of the system. Thus, predators 
were not a relevant factor and could be excluded from the target. How do scientists 
actually determine whether a factor is relevant? They (with one or two exceptions)7 
do not go around culling or fumigating parts of the world to test if a factor was 
indeed relevant. Instead, they make inferences about the performance of a particu-
lar system based on background knowledge and data and knowledge of similar sys-
tems. In this case, the scientists could eliminate predators from the target because 
they knew that predation rates were constant before and after the drop in the VIM 
population.
Of course, sometimes this information is not available. Then, scientists will have 
to conduct an experiment to determine whether something really is a relevant causal 
factor, or run different versions of a model, with and without the causal factor. In 
fact, there are some cases where scientists make mistakes, such as believing a fac-
tor to be irrelevant when it is, in fact, relevant. In this case, the sociality of the VIM 
could have been such a factor. Yet because of the preliminary work conducted to 
specify the target system, the scientists were able to identify it as a relevant factor. 
That is, they were aware of the fact that the VIM, unlike other marmots, were highly 
social, so when the simple logistic growth model did not line up with the VIM popu-
lation decline, they considered it as a relevant factor. This kind of mistake is to be 
expected in science, especially when a discipline is young or when a new phenom-
enon is being investigated. Nonetheless, I believe that paying closer attention to the 
target system can help to mitigate the frequency and effect of these mistakes. I will 
illustrate with an example from plant ecology.
7 See for example Simberloff and Wilson’s (1969) fumigation experiments on islands in Florida, in order 
to study migration, which was instrumental in the establishment of the theory of biogeography.
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For many years, various models (e.g. of competition, invasion, drought sensitiv-
ity) yielded erratic and surprising results when applied to plant populations (Berger 
et al. 2008; Phillips et al. 2016; Suding et al. 2013). Plant ecologists were unable 
to explain why this was the case, until they realised that when it comes to plants, 
what happens below the ground is much more important than what happens above it 
(Phillips et al. 2016). They discovered that many models suffer from a ‘surface bias’, 
as they do not include below-ground factors. Including these factors in the models 
increases their performance (i.e. yields more accurate explanations and predictions). 
According to Phillips et al., the scientific community was aware of the existence of 
these below-ground factors, yet they did not believe they were important enough 
to include in the models. When the scientists re-examined the systems, looking for 
factors that could be relevant, i.e. re-examining their target systems, they found the 
missing factors and improved their models. In fact, this realisation has resulted in 
the establishment of a new field (plant-soil feedback), which has revolutionised our 
understanding of plant competition and invasiveness (van der Putten 2013).
To sum up, scientists can test the aptness of their target by determining whether 
their partitions are useful for their investigation and whether the have correctly iden-
tified which parts and properties should be omitted from the system. These tests are 
based on background knowledge and data and is far from foolproof. Nonetheless, 
paying attention to the aptness of a target at an early stage of an investigation can 
increase the likelihood that the investigation’s results are successful.
Loose ends: general and hypothetical targets
Even if we agree that target systems can be real-world systems, does this mean that 
all target systems are real world systems? In the literature, there are two interesting 
cases with alternative conceptions of target systems: targets of general models and 
hypothetical targets. I will examine each of these cases in turn, arguing that they are 
legitimate ways to understand target systems, but conceptually dependent on real-
world targets.
Targets of general models
In his classifications of models and modelling, Weisberg (2013) argues that in some 
cases scientists construct general models, because they are not interested in particu-
lar instances of phenomena, but in classes of phenomena. These models are often 
very simple, in the sense that they aim to capture only the basic dynamics of a sys-
tem and include very little detail. For example, he argues that a generalized model of 
sexual reproduction is not meant to uncover facts about sexual reproduction in par-
ticular populations, but to understand larger issues such as the relative merits of sex-
ual reproduction when compared to asexual reproduction. Weisberg identifies two 
distinct functions for general models. The first is their use in minimalist idealization, 
when scientists construct models that capture the core causal factors a phenome-
non that are common across many different manifestations of that phenomenon, but 
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leave out the details that are particular to various manifestations (p. 119). The sec-
ond is the generation of how-possibly explanations, explanations of how a phenom-
enon could come about, rather than why it did come about e.g., “what is a possible 
reason for sexual reproduction when asexual reproduction is less costly?” (p. 118).
According to Weisberg (2013), the target systems of general models are them-
selves general. They are abstractions over particular target systems that lie at the 
intersection of a number of specific targets and have the features common to all tar-
gets that the model can represent. For example, in the case of sexual reproduction, 
the generalized target is meant to have the set of properties are shared by all sexu-
ally reproducing species. Once the relevant features shared by all specific targets are 
identified, the scientist can abstract further by leaving out all the specifics of each 
case and focusing only on those generalized properties. This could spell trouble for 
my account, as general, abstract targets cannot be said to be real parts of the world.
There are two ways to respond to this point. The first is that on Weisberg’s 
account, abstract targets are causally and ontologically dependent on particular tar-
gets. Scientists construct the generalized target by identifying the features that all the 
particular targets share, and then abstracting over them.8 Thus, if we allow for the 
existence of abstract targets, we must also allow for the existence of particular tar-
gets. This means that the mere existence of abstract targets is fully compatible with 
my account of particular, real world targets.
Second, Weisberg seems to imply that scientists using general models are not 
interested in particular manifestations of a phenomenon in various real-world pop-
ulations. For example, he argues that the point of studying sex in a general man-
ner is not to discover facts about sexual reproduction in particular populations, but 
to understand larger issues such as the relative merits of sexual reproduction when 
compared to asexual reproduction. Thus, “generalized model of sexual reproduc-
tion isn’t supposed to be about kangaroo sex or fungi sex, but about sex itself.” (p. 
115). It seems that Weisberg is only considering one of the two functions he previ-
ously identified, i.e. how possibly explanations. In fact, many general models are 
used to learn about real world populations, many real-world populations. For exam-
ple, the model used for the VIM is, by all accounts, a general model of population 
growth, which has been applied to the particular target of the VIM. Of course, this 
is not the only target of this general model. In fact, one could argue that what makes 
the logistic growth model general is not that it informs as about growth in general, 
but that it has many particular targets; it informs us about Vancouver Island mar-
mot growth and bacteria growth and Arabidopsis growth and so on. In these cases, 
8 Weisberg also states that there are more complex cases where the model is less abstract than the target 
(e.g. individual-based models). In these cases, he argues that the scientist must restrict the model’s scope 
so that it conforms to the actual target. For example, if a scientist wished to construct an agent-based 
model of sexual reproduction she would need to add concrete properties such as the life-cycle, spatial 
distributions and fitness of individual organisms, which are not part of the abstract target. It is unclear 
how, given this necessary scope restriction, it would be possible to ever construct an agent-based model 
of sexual reproduction. However, the reason for the mismatch is the reliance on the previously identified 
‘abstract target’. It seems much more plausible to allow the scientist to apply the (less) abstract model to 
the particular real-world target she is interested in.
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the generalised target is simply shorthand for referring to a family of actual targets 
which share common properties. Thus, the only reason that general targets are useful 
is because they can be reduced to actual targets.
Still, Weisberg is right that there are some cases where scientists use general 
models to learn about phenomena in general. Even if we allow that there exist both 
real-world particular targets and abstract targets for each general model, we might 
want to determine which should take precedence as that which the model is about. 
A different way of putting the point is, should we be pluralists about the nature of 
target systems or are there reasons to favour one or the other type of target? I will 
address this issue in section “Pluralism about target systems?”, after examining the 
possibility of hypothetical target systems.
Targets of hypothetical models
Weisberg’s classification includes a second case of potentially non-real targets, those 
represented by hypothetical models. These are models that, by definition, do not 
represent particular systems in the world, as those systems do not or cannot exist 
(e.g. models of perpetual motion machines or genetics models with multiple sexes).9 
Instead, they are thought to represent hypothetical systems or ‘possibilities’. Take, 
for example, a model of a simple harmonic oscillator. The equations of the model 
describe a system that experiences a restoring force when displaced from its original 
position, and this force is proportional to its displacement. This model also describes 
the movement of pendula when they do not have any friction to dampen the oscil-
latory movement. Of course, there is no such thing as a pendulum in the world that 
does not experience any friction; it is probably impossible for such a pendulum to 
exist. What is the target system of the model in this case?
The answer depends on the model’s intended use. If the scientists wish to learn 
about a hypothetical system, then their target will be hypothetical. Yet, the mere 
existence of hypothetical targets does not negate the existence of real-world particu-
lar targets. It is more probable that scientists will apply the model to the world, in 
order to learn about actual pendula (such as Ron Giere’s grandfather clock). In cases 
like these it is quite obvious that the model’s target is a real-world system (here the 
actual pendulum in Ron Giere’s grandfather clock). The fact that the model does not 
take into account friction constitutes an idealization, thus the model is an idealized 
(and strictly speaking inaccurate) representation of the clock. This is no different to 
pretending that a population is infinitely large, smoothing out the surface of the sun 
for Newtonian planetary motion, or even merely changing the amount of friction in 
the model. Whether or not this is a good model for a particular purpose, depends 
on the goal of the scientists, and cannot be determined here (it is an empirical ques-
tion). The point is, that the model represents the clock, not a hypothetical pendulum.
9 I should note that hypothetical models should not be confused with targetless models. The latter are 
intended not to be about any type of target—real, imaginary or otherwise—and hence are not relevant for 
this discussion.
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Of course, just like in the case of general models, one could argue that the model 
represents the clock in addition to it representing a hypothetical pendulum. I turn to 
this issue next.
Pluralism about target systems?
Even if we agree that some or even most target systems are real parts of the world, 
we might still wish to adopt a pluralistic attitude towards the ontological status of 
target systems. Weisberg’s motivation behind the claim that general and hypothetical 
models have corresponding general and hypothetical targets is the intentions of the 
scientists that use them. In both cases, he maintains that scientists are not interested 
in real, particular systems, but in abstract or hypothetical systems. In the previous 
two sections I showed that this claim is overstated, as scientists utilizing general and 
hypothetical models are often interested in learning about real, particular systems.
Nonetheless, it is a much stronger claim to maintain that scientists are never inter-
ested in learning about general or hypothetical systems, and one which I have no 
reason to make. It suffices, for my purposes, to show that a significant proportion of 
target systems are real particular systems. Their reality stems from them being parts 
of the world, and they come about because of how scientists apply their models to 
the world. Yet this does not mean that scientists are always interested in learning 
about parts of the world, or indeed applying every single instance of a model to a 
part of the world. In these cases, I agree that their models do not target parts of the 
world.
The question is whether we should call these systems target systems, or whether 
we should restrict the term to the systems that are real parts of the world. While I 
think that this type of pluralism can be confusing, I am not opposed to it in princi-
ple. It is acceptable for a pluralist to denote all these systems target systems, pro-
vided that there is sufficient attention paid to the real-world target systems, and their 
value for scientific investigations. If, on the other hand, the call for pluralism stems 
from the notion that identifying the real-world target is uninteresting or unimportant, 
despite claims that the model is intended to be informative about a part of the world, 
then this is much more problematic.
Conclusion
Target systems are best understood as concrete parts of the world. There are cases 
where it may help to conceptualise a target as an abstract or hypothetical system, yet 
these conceptions are dependent on the conception of targets as parts of the world. 
Target systems have a place in discussions of scientific modelling, because target 
system specification is a crucial aspect of scientific practice. Even though target sys-
tems are parts of the world, they can more or less apt with respect to a particu-
lar purpose. Moreover, target system specification takes up a lot of time, effort and 
resources but can also be extremely valuable, as it allows scientists to understand 
the causes of model failure (i.e. failure to predict or explain a phenomenon). Paying 
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close attention to a particular target system can also help scientists to choose the 
right model or construct it in such a way as to minimise the risk of failure.
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